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The central claim in this essay is that Hannah Arendt advanced two different 
concepts of judgment: The first is moral and it is her Socratic reinterpretation of 
Kant’s «categorical imperative»; the second is political and it represents her So-
cratic adaptation of Kant’s «enlarged mentality». I show that Arendt’s concepts of 
judgment runs on two different trains of thought throughout her work. One train 
branches out of her characterization of Adolf Eichmann as a thoughtless being, and 
it mostly consists of both her exploration of the possible relation between think-
ing and morality and her quest for an autonomous source of morality. In this first 
case, Arendt reframes Kant’s categorical imperative in Socratic terms by revealing 
a principle of non-imperative self-respect. The second train of thought is less con-
tingent; it stems out of Arendt’s realization that recovering plurality and the world 
in-between men would require more than just the phenomenological recovery of 
political action, it requires the recovery of the public and equi-vocal manifestation 
of thought. In this other case, Arendt suggests a reevaluation of the Socratic phroni-
mos by way of the Kantian notions of sensus communis and enlarged mentality. 
The result is her concept of Judging.
Keywords: Hannah Arendt. judging. political judgment. Socrates. Kant.
Hannah Arendt’s work has the great value of providing insights into the po-
litical consequences of the modern technicization of human affairs. Indeed, flow-
ing steadily throughout her oeuvre is an undercurrent of attempts to recover an 
authentically political experience, a loss men have suffered in their modern sur-
render to necessity. Arendt’s political thought is anchored in two central, unique 
concepts: action and judging. No doubt, action is the central category in her 
political theory; for her, rescuing human affairs, especially politics, from world-
alienation and consumption depends on reclaiming the distinction between it 
labor and work. Arendt’s concept of judging, however, is elusive because it ap-
pears in scattered references throughout her work and remains unfinished.
Unlike scholars who tend to refer and analyze Arendt’s concept of «judging» 
as if it was uniform, I claim that Hannah Arendt advanced two different con-
cepts of judgment that have to be examined in their specificity. The first is her 
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Socratic reinterpretation of Kant’s «categorical imperative», which is moral; the 
second represents her Socratic adaptation of Kant’s «enlarged mentality» which 
results in the notion of political judging. Failing to understand and uphold the 
difference between these two forms of judgment has lead commentators and 
critics to obscure the peculiarity of the political that is central for the form of 
active citizenship that recognizes the common world at its inter-est that Arendt 
proposes 1. In contrast, Upholding Arendt’s distinction allows a better under-
standing of how her attempt to recover political action (active citizenship) entails 
limiting the role of morality in public affairs at the same time it suggests a new 
ethical position in relation to both the world and those who dwell in it.
In this essay, I will show that Arendt’s concepts of judgment run on two dif-
ferent trains of thought throughout her work. One train branches out of her 
characterization of Adolf Eichmann as a thoughtless being, and it mostly consists 
of both her exploration of the possible relation between thinking and morality 
and her quest for an autonomous source of morality. In this first case, Arendt 
reframes Kant’s categorical imperative in Socratic terms by revealing a principle 
of non-imperative self-respect. The second train of thought is less contingent; 
it stems out of Arendt’s realization that recovering plurality and the world in-
between men would require more than just the phenomenological recovery of 
political action, it requires the recovery of the public and equi-vocal manifesta-
tion of thought. In this other case, Arendt suggests a reevaluation of the Socratic 
phronimos by way of the Kantian notion of sensus communis.
1. Moral judgment and the principle of non-imperative self-respect
Hannah Arendt attended Adolf Eichmann’s trial in jerusalem in 1961 and 
worked on a report for The New Yorker during 1962. She published the report 
the following year both as a series of articles and as a book. The reference to 
Adolf Eichmann’s inability to think, which Arendt incorporates in her report 
of the trial, is superficial at most 2. In brief, Arendt’s claim is that thoughtless-
ness —which is manifest in Eichmann’s intensive use of bureaucratic jargon and 
1 For example, jenniffer Nedelsky’s interpretation of the social conception of the autonomy of 
judgment as fundamental for optimizing judiciary judging overstrains and misapprehends the particu-
larity of Arendt’s notions of moral and political judgments; Albrecht Wellmer supposes that Arendt at-
tempted to «assimilate political and moral judgment, structurally speaking, to aesthetic judgment in the 
Kantian sense»; from a different perspective, while trying to explain why taste is the sense from which 
(political) judging is derived, Elizabeth Young-Bruehl turns to the element of disgust in Kant’s moral 
philosophy and misinterprets Arendt’s recovery of the notion of «sociability» as directed towards a 
possible consideration of «how we experience the solidarity of mankind»; and Bryan Garsten confuses 
the distinctive foundations of moral and political judgments when he claims that, for Arendt «the 
intersubjective point of view grounds moral judgments that are not based on a definite set of reasons 
or rules and yet are also not inscrutable to others». See Nedelsky and Wellmer’s chapters in Beiner and 
Nedelsky, 2001: 103-120, 165-181, Young-Bruehl, 1982: 299, Benhabib, 2010: 328.
2 This is the only reference to Eichmann’s inability to think in Arendt report: «The longer one 
listened to him, the more obvious it became that his inability to speak was closely connected with an 
inability to think, namely, to think from the standpoint of somebody else. No communication was pos-
sible with him because he was surrounded by the most reliable of all safeguards against the words and 
the presence of others, and hence against reality itself», Arendt, 1964.
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clichés, and in his inability to think from the standpoint of someone else— could 
«wreak more havoc than all the evil instincts taken together» 3. As a consequence 
of the controversy produced by her report on Eichmann’s trial, Arendt wrote 
and lectured on the topic of morality for several years. Notwithstanding the 
frequent interruptions occasioned by her intense lecturing and her husband’s 
long convalescence 4, Arendt made a long and sustained effort to understand the 
relation between morality and the activity of thinking.
Later in her work, as she goes further in her explorations of morality, Arendt 
will turn from analyzing the relation between thoughtlessness and the «banality 
of evil» towards analyzing thoughtlessness as an indication of conscience de-
ficiency 5. In so doing, I will show, she travels back to Socrates via Kant. The 
outcome, paradoxically, is a shift of emphasis from the relation between thinking 
(as a dialogue between one and one’s self) and morality, to the relation between 
conscience (as self-cross-examination) and morality. As we will see, Arendt’s ex-
plorations on the relation between thinking and morality develop into a quest 
for an autonomous source of morality that could survive both the muting of the 
voice of God and the increasing relativity of mores 6. Such autonomous source of 
morality is rooted in her Socratic adaptation of Kant’s categorical imperative in 
the form of non-imperative self-respect.
1.1. Personal responsibility and independent judgment
The starting point of Arendt’s work on morality is the distinction she draws 
between guilt and responsibility in «personal Responsibility Under dictator-
ship». In this piece she explains how those who refused to collaborate with the 
Nazi regime retained their capacity for independent judgment and hence es-
caped the consequences of the collapse of morality that permeated «respectable» 
German society. Her distinction between guilt and responsibility echoes her cri-
tique of Karl jaspers’ Question of German Guilt 7. Arendt insists that «there is 
3 Arendt does not make any generalizations out of Eichmann’s apparent inability to think in the 
main body of her report on the trial. This changes, however, when she explains (although not neces-
sarily in a satisfactory manner) the notion of banality of evil and its relation to thoughtlessness in the 
«postscript» she adds to the 1964 edition of the book.
4 See (Young-Bruehl, 2004: 389-397).
5 Her explorations are at the center of the courses on moral philosophy she taught at the New 
School for Social Research (Some questions on moral philosophy, 1965) and at the University of Chicago 
(Basic Moral Propositions and Kant’s moral philosophy, 1966), and would reach its most elaborated 
form in her 1971 lecture on «Thinking and moral Considerations».
6 In her notes for her lecture Some Questions of Moral Philosophy given at The New School for 
Social Research in 1965, Arendt writes: «[A]t the moment morality collapsed... no one was any longer 
afraid of an avenging God or, more concretely speaking, of possible punishments in a hereafter». «All 
we know is that hardly anyone thought these old beliefs fit for public justification». «That ours is the 
first generation... in which the masses... no longer believe in “future states”... and who therefore are 
committed... [t]o think of conscience as an organ that will react without hope for rewards and without 
fear of punishment. Whether people still believe that this conscience is informed by some divine voice 
is, to say the very least, open to doubt» (Arendt, 2003: 63, 64, 89).
7 Arendt’s rather pungent critique of jaspers’ notion of German guilt appears in her correspon-
dence with her husband, Heinrich Blücher: «jaspers’ guilt-monograph despite all its beauty and noble-
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not such a thing as collective guilt or collective innocence; guilt and innocence 
makes sense only if applied to individuals»; unlike political responsibility, which 
«every government assumes for the deeds and misdeeds of its predecessor and 
every nation for the deeds and misdeeds of the past», guilt is strictly individual 8.
This distinction is critical to understanding that —as Arendt claimed in Eich-
mann in Jerusalem— those who participated in and collaborated with the Nazi 
government were not simply cogs, dispensable parts in the large machinery of 
the Third Reich. Collaborators’ and participants’ individual responsibility can-
not be buried under the claim that «every organization demands obedience to 
superiors as well as obedience to the laws of the land», which implicitly denies 
«the human faculty of judgment». Individual responsibility, Arendt argues, can-
not be shifted «from man to system» 9.
This stress on personal responsibility also informs Arendt’s argument con-
cerning those who refrained from collaborating with the Nazis; for assuming col-
lective guilt would simply disregard the significance of such individual decisions. 
She emphasizes that nonparticipation can and did occur even in the context of 
a total moral collapse, and that this was hardly the result of observing the old 
system of values and standards. Instead, nonparticipants, unlike those who col-
laborated, «asked themselves to what extent they would still be able to live in 
peace with themselves after committing certain deeds... they refused to murder, 
not so much because they still held fast to the command “Thou shall not kill”, 
but because they were unwilling to live with a murderer —themselves—» 10. The 
central question for Arendt thus becomes: «How can you think, and even more 
important in our context, how can you judge without holding on to preconceived 
standards, norms, and general rules under which the particular cases and instances 
can be subsumed?» 11.
In its simplest form, Arendt’s argument is this: Unlike those who supported 
Nazism and «h[e]ld fast to [prevailing] moral norms and standards», nonpartici-
pants were: a) unwilling to «live with [themselves as] a murderer» and b) accus-
tomed to examining things and «to mak[ing] up their minds». Nonparticipants 
were the only ones, Arendt claims, «who dared to judge by themselves... [They] 
were those whose consciences did not function in this, as it were, automatic 
way... Their criterion, I think, was a different one: they asked themselves to what 
mindedness, is an anathematized and Hegelized, Christian/pietistic/hypocritical nationalizing piece of 
twaddle...» (Arendt and Blücher, 2000: 1985-1986).
8 The fallacy of the concept of collective guilt, Arendt explains, is that its admission results in «a 
very effective, though unintended, whitewash of those who had done something... where all are guilty, 
no one is» (Arendt, 2003: 28-30, 43). See also Arendt, 2003: 147-158.
9 Arendt, 2003: 32, 41, 42-43, 46. The emphasis on personal responsibility is consistent through-
out Arendt’s writings. See Arendt, 2003: 148, 158.
10 Arendt, 2003: 44. Richard Bernstein has raised questions about the limits of Arendt’s interpreta-
tion of Eichmann’s motives: «I think that Arendt tends to overstate her case about Eichmann. Ironi-
cally, she was always deeply skeptical about the ability to penetrate the “darkness of one’s heart”, to say 
with confidence what one’s own or another’s “real” motives are». The same question can be raised here 
as to just how Arendt knew that every nonparticipant was «unwilling to live with a murderer» and was 
not holding past to old values and standards (Bernstein, 1996: 170).
11 Arendt, 2003: 26, my emphasis.
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extent they would still be able to live in peace with themselves after committing 
certain deeds» 12.
Arendt is looking to turn, thus, the self into the central agent of morality. In 
order to eschew modern relativism and volatility of mores Arendt makes morality 
self-referential, which makes the relation between one and one’s self more impor-
tant, in moral terms, than the relation between oneself and either other men or 
the world. For Arendt, the moral censure of murder is not a matter of safeguard-
ing «life» but of safeguarding the relation with one’s self. The relationship with 
one’s self, she argues, is a higher good than life itself: one should not kill, not 
because of the harm it will inflict on another, but because one is unwilling to live 
with one’s self as a murderer 13.
Unlike «independent thinking» 14, «independent judgment» does not aim 
to question truths, but to discern what is morally right from what is morally 
wrong without applying any standards (regardless of whether moral standards 
have been «shaken» either by thinking or by a drastic change of mores) 15. This 
supports her argument against collective guilt and makes space for the claim 
that individuals are able to make autonomous moral decisions —which would 
prove that they are responsible for their actions regardless of their motives (or 
lack thereof). Arendt thus embarks on the search for the principles that regulate 
moral action within the autonomy of the self.
1.2. The Socratic deconstruction of the Kantian categorical imperative
The basic claim at the center of Arendt’s explorations on morality is that 
moral philosophy had been at an impasse since Socrates until Kant appeared on 
the scene 16. during this time, morality was distorted into a matter of imposing 
transcendent yardsticks and measurements à la plato. Arendt’s main claim is 
that moral teaching should not be pronounced as absolute commands of divine 
origin 17.
Arendt finds a renewed, modern, and rationalistic argument for the autono-
my of the self in Kant’s moral philosophy. According to her, Kant reclaims moral 
philosophy as a «“strictly” human affair» in which «moral conduct... seems to 
depend primarily upon the intercourse of man with himself». In this sense, the 
categorical imperative works as a rationalized operation of non-self-contradic-
tion that emphasizes one’s moral autonomy; morality, for Kant, «is not a matter 
of concern with the other but with the self, not of meekness but of human dignity 
12 Arendt, 2003: 44, 45, my emphasis.
13 In the same vein, Arendt writes in «Collective Responsibility»: If it is a question of killing, «the 
argument would not be that the world would be better off without the murder being done, but the 
unwillingness to live with an assassin». Arendt, 2003: 51, 156.
14 See Selbstdenken in Arendt, 1968: 8-10.
15 Arendt’s work on morality unfortunately suffers from the lack of a clear distinction between 
these two mental activities. See Bernstein, 1996: 172, 173; Arendt, 2003: 131.
16 Arendt, 2003: 67.
17 Arendt, 2003: 51, 64-65.
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and even human pride. The standard is neither the love of some neighbor nor 
self-love, but self-respect» 18.
Arendt uses Kant’s categorical imperative to reinforce both the self’s centrality 
and autonomy in moral matters with the argument that morality is the result of a ra-
tional process and not a specific form of applicable knowledge. However, she finds 
the limit of Kantian moral philosophy in the imperativeness of the categorical 19. In 
Kantian terms, obeying the categorical imperative means «that I am obeying my 
own reason, and the law which I give myself is valid for all rational creatures». In 
other words, ones’ will has to yield to one’s reason, which is why «Kant, knowing 
that the will —this faculty unknown to antiquity— can say no to reason, felt it nec-
essary to introduce an obligation». This sense of obligation, however, is exactly what 
Arendt eschews. She is looking for a notion of morality that is not formulated in im-
perative form, that is, for a moral source that has «nothing to do with obedience to 
any law that is given from the outside —be it the law of God or the laws of men» 20. 
This is why Arendt turns to Socrates in search of the exemplary «moral man».
Arendt focuses on the paradoxical proposition that Socrates pronounces in 
Gorgias: «It is better to suffer wrong than to do wrong» 21. She claims that this 
proposition presupposes yet another, namely that: «It would be better for me 
that my lyre or a chorus I directed should be out of tune and loud with discord, 
and that multitudes of men should disagree with me rather than that I, being 
one, should be out of harmony with myself and contradict me» 22. Arendt com-
bines both propositions in one:
Even though I am one, I am not simply one, I have a self and I am related to this 
self as my own self. This self is by no means an illusion; it makes itself heard by talking 
to me —I talk to myself, I am not only aware of myself— and in this sense, though I 
am one, I am two-in-one and there can be harmony or disharmony with the self. If I dis-
agree with other people, I can walk away; but I cannot walk away from myself... if I do 
wrong I am condemned to live together with a wrongdoer in an unbearable intimacy 23.
As with Kant, the Socratic moral act requires no special organ «because you 
remain within yourself and no transcendent standard... informs you of right and 
wrong». But even more importantly, the Socratic proposition, unlike the limita-
tions of Kantian moral philosophy, implies neither commandments nor obliga-
tions. It simply declares: «[I]t is better to suffer wrong than to do wrong, and 
not: Thou shalt suffer wrong rather than do it» 24.
18 Arendt, 2003: 62-63, 66, 67.
19 «The real imperative underlying the categorical imperative is: don’t contradict yourself. And 
this is clearly the basic law of thinking, or a command of reason» (Young-Bruehl, 2004: 366, my em-
phasis).
20 Kant felt the need «to give his rational proposition an obligatory character». For him, Good 
Will is the «will that when told “Thou shalt” will answer, “Yes, I will”». This is how Kant «introduced 
the form of the imperative and brought back the concept of obedience, through a back door as it 
were». Arendt, 2003: 68, 69, 72, 77, my emphasis.
21 Arendt, 2003: 82.
22 Arendt quotes this proposition later, in Arendt, 2003: 181.
23 Arendt, 2003: 90, my emphasis.
24 It is in this respect that Arendt claims that nonparticipators «did not feel an obligation but acted 
according to something which was self-evident to them even though it was no longer self-evident to 
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Arendt thus reclaims the Kantian reinforcement of both the self’s centrality 
and autonomy in order to remodel the categorical imperative in Socratic terms. 
By returning to Socrates  via Kant, she uncovers the principle of non-imperative 
self-respect, finding therein an independent and subjective source of morality.
This principle is further elaborated at the end of «Thinking and moral Con-
siderations», a lecture Arendt gave in 1971. Here Arendt confirms that the au-
tonomous source of morality she has been looking for is not thinking but some-
thing at the core of its «very performance» 25. She thus redirects her gaze towards 
consciousness and conscience:
In the last section of «Thinking and moral Considerations» Arendt recurs 
again to the two positive Socratic propositions in Gorgias 26. Arendt explains that 
the first proposition is «a subjective statement», which declares that «it is bet-
ter for me to suffer wrong than to do wrong». The proposition therefore refers 
to man as man and not as citizen because the concern is with the self and not 
with the world. The second proposition points to a difference «inserted into my 
Oneness» despite the fact that I appear as one to others. This difference in one’s 
self is consciousness, that is, «the curious fact that in a sense I also am for myself, 
though I hardly appear to me» 27. The very possibility of self-harmony or contra-
diction presupposes that the individual is conscious of her self.
From these two positive Socratic propositions, Arendt derives a moral prin-
ciple: «It is better to suffer wrong than to do wrong because you can remain the 
friend of a sufferer; who would want to be the friend of or have to live together 
with a murderer? Not even a murderer». In short, the fear to living with one’s 
self as a wrongdoer is also a manifestation of the difference in one’s Oneness 28, 
and the moral limit of one’s action is, in this sense, one’s unwillingness to live 
with a wrongdoer.
This is rendered explicit in the passages that Arendt quotes as examples 
—from Richard III and from Hippias Major. Richard III fears his conscience, 
which «appears as an afterthought, that thought that is aroused by... a crime»; 
those around them. Hence their conscience, if that was what it was, had no obligatory character, it said, 
“This I can’t do”, rather than “This I ought not to do”» (Arendt, 2003: 91, 77, 79).
25 «We are left with the conclusion that only people filled with this eros, this desiring love of 
wisdom, beauty and justice, are capable of thought —that is we are left with plato’s «noble nature» 
as a prerequisite for thinking. And this was precisely what we were not looking for when we raised the 
question whether the thinking activity, the very performance itself —as distinguished from and regard-
less of whatever qualities a man’s nature, his soul, may posses— conditions him in such a way that he 
is incapable of evil». (Arendt, 2003: 180, my emphasis) Arendt writes something similar in Thinking: 
«It looks as though Socrates had nothing more to say about the connection between evil and lack of 
thought than that people who are not in love of beauty, justice, and wisdom are incapable of thought, 
just as, conversely, those who are in love with examining and thus «do philosophy» would be incapable 
of doing evil». (Arendt, 1981: 179).
26 The distinction between the Socratic «desiring love of wisdom» and «consciousness» is easy 
to miss. This explains why George Kateb claims that in Arendt’s exploration on morality «Socrates is 
one kind of absolutely good man» and that his two propositions serve as «the basis for Socratic moral 
absolutism.» (Kateb, 1984: 37).
27 Arendt, 2003: 182, 183, 184.
28 Conscience is no more «supposed to tell us what to do and what to repent of; it was the voice of 
God before it became the lumen naturale or Kant’s practical reason». Arendt, 2003: 185, 186.
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whereas in the case of Socrates, conscience appears as an afterthought aroused 
«by unexamined opinions» 29. Both Richard III and Socrates feel remorse when 
in solitude, the former as a consequence of his «hateful deeds», the latter as a 
consequence of neglecting to ponder his opinions. In these two cases, however, 
conscience is an afterthought, that is, it appears after the deed.
The only time conscience is depicted as having the potential to prevent evil 
is found in an example Arendt mentions in passing only: «as the anticipated fear 
of such afterthoughts... [in] the hired murderers in Richard III» 30. Arendt’s refer-
ence is to the dialogue between the two murderers who, in the play, are about to 
kill the duke of Clarence:
SECOND MURDERER. What, shall I stab him as he sleeps?
FIRST MURDERER. No; he’ll say ‘twas done cowardly, when he wakes.
SECOND MURDERER. Why, he shall never wake until the great judg-
ment-day.
FIRST MURDERER. Why, then he’ll say we stabb’d him sleeping.
SECOND MURDERER. The urging of that word judgment hath bred a kind of 
remorse in me.
FIRST MURDERER. What, art thou afraid?
SECOND MURDERER. Not to kill him, having a warrant; but to be damn’d 
for killing him, from which no warrant can defend me.
FIRST MURDERER. I thought thou hadst been resolute.
SECOND MURDERER. So I am, to let him live.
FIRST MURDERER. I’ll back to the Duke of Gloucester and tell him so.
SECOND MURDERER. Nay, I prithee, stay a little. I hope this passionate hu-
mour of mine will change; it was wont to hold me but while one tells twenty.
FIRST MURDERER. How dost thou feel thyself now?
SECOND MURDERER. Faith, some certain dregs of conscience are yet with-
in me.
Arendt concludes that «what makes a man fear this conscience is the antici-
pation of the presence of a witness who awaits him only if and when he goes 
home», that is, the anticipation of the most subjective consequence of wrongdo-
ing: remorse 31. This is why Arendt’s claim that «the nonwicked everybody who 
has no special motives and for this reason is capable of infinite evil... never meets 
his midnight disaster» 32, literally means that such a wrongdoer is never afraid of 
feeling guilt 33. Thinking, being the manifestation of the dialogue between one 
and one’s self, functions here as the symptom that makes the two-in-one partition 
29 Arendt, 2003: 186, 187.
30 Arendt, 2003: 187, my emphasis.
31 Seyla Benhabib is mistaken when she claims that Arendt «described conscience as the harmony 
or oneness of the soul with itself» for, as shown above, Arendt describes conscience as the «cross ex-
amination» of one’s self. See Benhabib, 1988: 44.
32 Arendt, 2003: 188, my emphasis.
33 This is how Arendt refers to non being afraid of feeling guilt in The Life of the Mind: «A person 
who does not know that silent intercourse (in which we examine what we say and what we do) will 
not mind contradicting himself, and this means he will never be either able or willing to account for 
what he says or does; nor will he mind committing any crime, since he can count on its being forgotten 
the next moment. Bad people —Aristotle to the contrary notwithstanding— are not “full of regrets”» 
(Arendt, 1981: 191).
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manifest. It is not that thinking is «essential for the formation of conscience», but 
that is indicative of the very existence of such a «witness», that is, the possibility 
of conscience 34.
Arendt’s quest for an autonomous source of morality thus comes to a close 
by anchoring moral judgment in the fear of remorse, or as George Kateb calls it: 
«a way of avoiding torment» 35. This reflects two things that Arendt found in the 
relation between thinking and morality. First, Arendt found that thinking could 
liberate «independent [moral] judgment» from the tethers of compulsory reli-
gious or rationalistic will by rendering it an expression of self-respect. The sec-
ond thing she found is not, strictly speaking, something in the relation between 
thinking and morality but, rather, a symptom of nonthinking. Whereas the «wind 
of thought» is the manifestation of conscience in the form of a friendly relation-
ship between one and one’s self, thoughtlessness indicates the nonoccurrence of 
a retreat into a situation of solitude where one could be «cross-examined» by 
one’s self. Arendt’s claim is that a thoughtless individual, such as Eichmann, is 
unafraid of remorse because he does not anticipate having to live with the shame, 
for instance, of facilitating the murder of thousands of individuals.
Whereas Arendt’s first finding about «independent judgment» seems to re-
quire a certain boldness to challenge established criteria and values, in the sec-
ond, the making of a moral decision is motivated by the fear of living with one’s 
self as a wrongdoer under relentless cross-examination 36. Here, the moral act 
of refraining from wrongdoing depends on fear of remorse in the form of con-
science, which is the constant cross-examination of one’s self 37.
Arendt’s objective is not to provide a post-Kantian moral principle. Her aim 
is to provide the groundwork for understanding personal responsibility in cases 
in which moral frameworks have collapsed, which allows her to explain both the 
motiveless criminality of Adolph Eichmann and the ultimate moral resort of non-
collaborators. Sure, her explorations on morality are plagued with shortcomings 
that are out of the scope of this essay. Notwithstanding, my claim is that Arendt’s 
notion of moral judgment —whose principle is a non-imperative self-respect that 
is manifest in the anticipation «of a witness who awaits [one] only if and when 
[one] goes home»— is fundamentally different from political judging which, as 
will see in the second part of this essay, is the foundation for a truthful dialogue 
in which everyone engaged can understand the truth in the other’s opinion by 
understanding how and in what specific manner the common world appears to 
the other. As moral judging’s main concern is the self and not the world it is not, 
and should never be, the foundation of politics.
34 Cfr. Richard j. Bernstein in Villa, 2000: 281.
35 As Arendt puts it more simply in her essay Crisis of the Republic: «The fear of being alone and 
having to face oneself can be a very effective dissuader from wrongdoing». Arendt, 1972: 67, Kateb, 
1984: 37.
36 In «philosophy and politics», Arendt poses the frightening consequences of committing evil 
as follows: «[A] murderer is not only condemned to the permanent company of his own murderous 
self, but he will see all other people in the image of his own action. He will live in a world of potential 
murderers» (Arendt, 2004: 440).
37 Arendt tends to blur the distinction between thinking and conscience. See Arendt, 2003: 101, 189.
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2. Political judging and the friendly equivocality of opinion
In stark contrast to the image of Socrates as an exemplary «moral man» that 
Arendt presents throughout her studies on the possible relation between think-
ing and morality, an ideal type of Socrates as phronimos («understanding man») 
stands at the center of her explorations on the political significance of thinking. 
This latter version of Socrates is present in Arendt’s consistent attempt to place 
the practice of public articulation of opinion (doxa) at the epicenter of her politi-
cal concept of understanding (Verstehen).
This singular approach to Socrates is inscribed in Arendt’s critique to the 
Western political tradition 38. Arendt reached into pre-platonic political experi-
ence in order to recover a notion of politics that existed in a context in which 
action had not been substituted by making, and thought and action had not 
parted company; that is, in a context where politics was not subjugated under 
the rule or supremacy of philosophical thought and standards. Arendt finds in 
Socratic maieutics the most genuine expression of a political experience that ac-
knowledges the value of opinion (doxa) by requiring the critical and equivocal 
positioning of all the participating individuals. The standard that Arendt intends 
to recover is «phronēsis, the insight of the political man» 39.
Throughout her explorations on the political significance of thinking, Ar-
endt places Socrates’ public articulation of opinion (doxa 40) at the epicenter of 
her concept of understanding (Verstehen). Her main objective is to provide the 
foundation for authentic political action and speech: understanding the oth-
ers’ points of view from the vulnerable and inconclusive position of «it appears 
to me». As I explain below, Arendt’s exemplary reinterpretation of Socrates 
as «phronimos» is not enough to explain how is it possible for an individual 
to make public a contestable opinion that is not strictly subjective. The funda-
mental question that Arendt faces is: What precisely does this vocalization of 
opinion —in the form of an «it seems to me» that is not private— presuppose? 
Arendt’s reinterpretation of Socrates as «phronimos» requires, thus, explaining 
how is that opinion is able to «override its subjective private conditions». For 
this reason Arendt resorts to Kant’s concept of sensus-communis —which is the 
centerpiece of his notion of reflective judgment. As we will see, Arendt looks 
into Kant’s notion of general agreeability for the groundwork for the contem-
porary recovery of the publicity and contestability of political action and speech 
(which explains why she turned her concept of understanding (Verstehen) into 
judging).
38 Arendt realized that, since its foundation, philosophy has been at odds with both politics and 
the public sphere for it was established through an act of fear and distrust of both opinion and plurality. 
She also concluded that the foundation of the Western philosophical tradition had yet another political 
consequence: the transposition into public space of relations of rulership, which had traditionally been 
confined to private life. Arendt criticizes, thus, the experiential impact of the devaluation of politics by 
tracking its transformation from a relation inter pares into a relation between rulers and ruled. Arendt, 
2005: 130-131). See also Arendt, 1998: 220-230, 2007b, 2007a.
39 Arendt, 2005: 168.
40 «To Socrates, as to his fellow citizens, doxa was the formulation in speech of what dokei moi, 
that is, “of what appears to me”» (Arendt, 2005: 14).
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2.1. Socratic understanding
Arendt’s political interpretation of Socrates’ maieutics and her concept of 
understanding are initially developed in both the lecture series on «philosophy 
and politics» that she gave at the University of Notre dame in 1954 41 and an ar-
ticle published the same year in Partisan Review under the title «Understanding 
and politics» 42. In these instances, Arendt puts forward the concept of under-
standing (Verstehen) as a fundamental condition for authentic politics with the 
objective of recuperating the centrality of opinion and persuasion along with a 
fundamentally intersubjective notion of the world.
In her lectures Arendt depicts Socrates not as a «philosopher» (sophos) but 
as an «understanding man» (phronimos). She makes clear that unlike the former, 
who has no place in the public realm of the polis, the latter is an active citizen 
that does not aspire to rule 43. In Arendt’s quest for a figure to contrast against 
both the professional thinker and the professional politician, Socrates comes to 
represent the public articulator of doxa who engages in dialogues with his fellow 
citizens about the common world. Arendt characterizes Socratic maieutic as «the 
art of midwifery: he wanted to help others give birth to what they themselves 
thought anyhow, to find their truth in their doxa». Unlike plato, she claims, 
Socrates regarded dialegesthai and rhétoriké as forms of persuasion that resulted 
in opinion (doxa). In Arendt’s interpretation, Socrates’ «maieutic was a political 
activity, a give and take, fundamentally on a basis of strict equality» 44.
The political character of maieutics lies not in its pedagogical implementa-
tion or in its publicity. Socrates did not simply engage in friendly dialogues with 
his fellow citizens; instead, she emphasizes, maieutic dialogue is the method of 
«mak[ing] friends out of Athens’ citizenry». The political element in maieutics is, 
thus, that it is a «truthful dialogue [in which] each of the friends can understand 
the truth in the other’s opinion. more than his friend as a person, one friend un-
derstands how and in what specific articulateness the common world appears to 
the other, who as a person is forever unequal or different» 45.
How is friendship related to understanding how the common world appears 
to the different and unequal other? Arendt claims that authentic political ac-
tion/speech requires the equivocal position that is only possible among friends 
(philia). This argument resembles a secular rendition of Arendt’s interpretation 
of Saint Augustine’s «neighborly love». Let’s recall the central characterization of 
brotherly (neighborly) love in Arendt’s doctoral dissertation:
We can meet the other only because both of us belong to the human race, it is 
only in the individual’s isolation in God’s presence that he becomes our neighbor. 
41 jerome Kohn published a «slightly different» version under the title Socrates in The Promise of 
Politics.
42 The article was published in partisan Review, xx/4 1954, although the version used here is the 
one edited by jerome Kohn. For details see Arendt, 1994: xix.
43 Arendt, 2004: 429.
44 Arendt, 2005: 15. Arendt, thus, finds in Socrates the epitome of political experience in which 
thought and action are performed simultaneously. Arendt, 2004: 434.
45 Arendt, 2005: 16, 17-18, my emphasis.
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By virtue of this isolation in God’s presence, the other is lifted out of the self-evident 
dependence in which all people live with each other, and then our connection with 
him is subject to the explicit obligation of kinship 46.
The political/secular twist in Arendt’s interpretation of neighborly love be-
comes all the more notable if we paraphrase the quotation: We can meet the other 
only because we both belong to the human race. It is only through dialogue in the 
presence of the common world that we can become friends [fellow citizens]. By vir-
tue of his presence in the common world, the other is lifted out of the self-evident 
inequality in which all people live, and then our connection with him becomes 
subject to the explicit friendly obligation to understand how the common world 
appears to each other. What seems to be a secular reinterpretation of Augus-
tine’s caritas , translates friendship into a relationship based on the equivocality 
necessary for understanding how the common world appears to others from a 
position of it-appears-to-me 47. This position is only possible among friends, not 
because there is no need of justice among friends (as in Aristotle), but because 
only among friends one can assume the vulnerable position of «it appears to me», 
rather than the uncompromising (and unfriendly) position of «I know».
participating in politics is, in this sense, a mutual understanding of perspec-
tives among friends. For it is only from this vulnerable position of «it appears to 
me» that one can come to persuade the others by understanding their point of 
view. Understanding requires, Arendt explains, «for each citizen to be articulate 
enough to show his opinion in its truthfulness and therefore to understand his fel-
low citizens» 48.
Arendt’s concept of understanding (Verstehen) is fundamentally different 
from both Vernunft and Verstand —which she insists in translating as reason and 
intellect— because it is not a matter of logical consistency and its fruits «could 
not be measured by the result of arriving at this or that general truth» 49. Under-
standing the others’ points of view from the vulnerable and inconclusive position 
of «it appears to me», as the essential experience in Socratic maieutics, is thus the 
exemplary exercise of recognizing the plurality of men and their opinions; it is, 
in this respect, the foundation of authentic political action/speech.
2.2. Kant’s sensus-communis
Arendt knew that recovering the political significance of the Socratic friend-
ly exercise of persuading from a position of «it appears to me» requires being 
grounded in a sense more common that the one shared by those filled with the 
«desiring love of wisdom» (philosophers). Understanding the others’ points of 
view from a (friendly) equivocal position requires a shared sense from which 
46 Arendt et al., 1996: 112.
47 Arendt, 2005: 14.
48 Arendt, 2005: 18, my emphasis.
49 «It is therefore obvious still quite in the Socratic tradition that plato’s early dialogues frequently 
concluded inconclusively, without a result. To have talked something through, to have talked about 
something, some citizen’s doxa, seemed result enough» (Arendt, 1994: 15-16).
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everyone can impute general agreeability; which is why Arendt resorts to Kant’s 
notion of sensus-communis. This results in an attempt to anchor the recuperation 
of the political significance of the Socratic friendly exercise of persuasion in the 
common experience of it «seems to me» that is implicit in aesthetic judgments.
Arendt suggests but never fully elaborates on the relation between under-
standing from the vulnerable position of «it appears to me» and Kant’s notion 
of reflective judgment in either «Introduction into politics» or «Understanding 
and politics» 50. A more explicit reference to the relation between phronēsis and 
reflective judgment appears latter in «The Crisis of Culture»:
That the capacity to judge is a specifically political ability in exactly the sense 
denoted by Kant, namely, the ability to see things not only from one’s own point of 
view but in the perspective of all those who happen to be present; even that judg-
ment may be one of the fundamental abilities of man as a political being insofar as 
it enables him to orient himself in the public realm, in the common world —these 
are insights that are virtually as old as articulated political experience. The Greeks 
called this ability ϕρονμησις, or insight, and they considered it the principal virtue 
or excellence of the statesman in distinction from the wisdom of the philosopher 51.
These references show that, since early in her work, Arendt knew that her 
concept of understanding was somehow anchored in Kant’s notion of reflective 
judgment. She has still to explain why judgment may be «one of the fundamental 
abilities of man as a political being» though, and the explanation comes at hand 
at last in Arendt’s Lectures on Kant’s Political Philosophy, where she looks for 
Kant’s unwritten political philosophy in his Third Critique.
In her lectures, Arendt insists on distinguishing Kant’s philosophy from tra-
ditional philosophy by claiming that his critique of the cognitive faculties «had 
actually dismantled the whole machinery that had lasted, though often under 
attack, for many centuries, deep into the modern age». She argues that, in direct 
opposition to dogmatism and skepticism, the Kantian critical method «recom-
mends itself by its modesty»; and although it does not deny that men might 
possess «a notion, an idea, of truth for regulating their mental processes», it con-
ceives it possible that they «are not capable, as finite beings, of the truth. (The 
Socratic: “No man is wise”)» 52. It is at this point that Arendt puts forward her 
(overstretched) interpretation of the Socratic approach of Kant’s critique:
To think critically, to blaze the trial of thought through prejudices, through un-
examined opinions and beliefs, is an old concern of philosophy, which we may date, 
insofar as it is a conscious enterprise, to the Socratic midwifery in Athens. Kant 
was not unaware of this connection. He said explicitly that he wished to proceed 
«in Socratic fashion» and to silence all objectors «by the clearest proof of [their] 
ignorance» 53.
Arendt thus peers Kant’s critical philosophy to Socrates’ method by locating 
both communicability and publicity at the intersection of Kant’s critique with 
50 Arendt, 2005: 168, my emphasis, 1994: 321, my emphasis.
51 Arendt, 1977: 221, my emphasis.
52 Arendt, 1982: 28-37.
53 Arendt, 1982: 36, my emphasis.
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Socratic maieutics. Her argument is that «according to Kant and according to 
Socrates» critical thinking «exposes itself to “the test of free and open examina-
tion”». However, Kant’s approach to publicity represents an obstacle for any 
attempt to recover a pluralistic and isonomic notion of politics because his con-
ception of freedom to speak and to publish is articulated form the position of 
«the thinker» 54.
Arendt proposes, then, amending Kant’s monophasic communicability from 
the perspective of the political man via the Socratic phronimos. She turns public 
examination into a multi-account conversation, that is, into a conversation that 
requires everyone who participates to state how and why he has come to hold a 
particular opinion (not to provide proofs). For her, in order to be authentically 
political, communicability requires critical thinking and openness on the part of 
everyone involved 55. Thus, she resorts to Socrates once more:
What Socrates did when he brought philosophy from the heavens down to earth 
and began to examine opinions about what went on between men was that he ex-
tracted from every statement its hidden or latent implications; that is what his mid-
wifery actually amounted to... Critical thinking to a very large extent consists of this 
kind of «analysis». This examination, in turn, presupposes that everyone is willing 
and able to render an account of what he thinks and says... Logon didonai, «to give 
an account» —not to prove, but to be able to say how one came to an opinion and for 
what reasons one formed it... The term itself is political in origin: to render accounts 
is what Athenian citizens asked of their politicians, not only in money matters but 
in matters of politics. They could be held responsible 56.
This means that the critical thinking necessary for authentic political speech 
is more than the testing of the validity of one’s own insight; it conveys the will 
to take a position from which to judge one’s opinion vis-à-vis the viewpoint of 
others. Instead of defending one’s own opinion against the standpoint of others, 
adopting this position entails «“verifying the observations of each by means of 
all the others”» 57. Critical thinking, thus, requires validating one’s own opinion 
from a «third view» that is obtainable only after taking into consideration the 
standpoint of others —which prevents the thinker from deserting the company 
of his fellow men 58. This «third view» or «general standpoint» represents stand-
ing equi-vocally (in a critical position) towards both the others’ opinions and also 
one’s own.
54 Arendt, 1982: 38-39, 40.
55 This illustrates the explicit influence of Karl jaspers’ concept of «communication» in Arendt’s 
concept of political action/speech. See Arendt, 1982: 40.
56 Arendt, 1982: 41.
57 Arendt, 1982: 42. We thus see that disch’s interpretation of Arendt’s use of the phrase «training 
one’s imagination to go visiting» is misleading. disch suggests that «Arendt’s visitor imagines how he or 
she might feel and think as a character in each of the several stories of events can give rise». However, 
Arendt is calling for a form of impartiality that does not reproduce the feelings or thoughts of «others» 
but, rather, reaches a general point of view that is different from both one’s own and that of others’ 
(disch, 1996: 159).
58 Arendt, 1982: 42. Arendt is taking precaution against the claim that one attains impartial ob-
jectivity only by rising to a «higher standpoint». Two examples are: the alienating fallacy of the Archi-
medean point Arendt refers to in The Human Condition and what is represented by the figure of the 
«umpire» in Kafka’s parable «He». See Arendt, 1998, Arendt, 1977: Preface.
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To be clear, a «general standpoint» from which one’s opinion can be equivo-
cally validated and improved is attained only by enlarging one’s mind, that 
is, by «abstracting from the limitations which contingently attach to out own 
judgment», or in other words, by «disregarding what we commonly call self-
interest» 59. Kant’s «general standpoint» is not a position that reflects an indi-
vidual’s personal taste, individual preferences, or personal/class interests; by 
enlarging one’s mind, one engages others in public disregarding one’s «subjective 
private conditions».
Arendt is suggesting neither a «solitary contemplator» 60 nor a «marginal 
critic» 61. much on the contrary, unlike Kant’s monophasic publicity, which piv-
ots around the thinker’s point of view, Arendt decenters publicity by taking into 
consideration the points of view of multiple spectators/actors, which are, in ad-
dition to being social and communicable, also contestable. It is true that, as Lisa 
jane disch affirms, «where [Kant] speaks of imputing or expecting agreement, 
[Arendt] speaks of dispute». But this is not because Arendt shifts the argument 
from «intersubjectivity to publicity» 62. Instead, Arendt emphasizes the intersub-
jectivity in publicity; in other words, Arendt is giving account of the other side of 
Kant’s notion of «expecting agreement». Let me explain. Kant writes thus about 
the public validity of aesthetic reflective judgments: «The judgment of taste itself 
does not postulate the agreement of everyone (for it is only competent for a logi-
cally universal judgment to do this, in that it is able to bring forwards reasons); it 
only imputes this agreement to everyone, as an instance of the rule in respect of 
which it looks for confirmation, not from concepts, but from the concurrence of 
others». This means that the intersubjective notion of the beautiful presupposed 
by the judgment «this rose is beautiful» imputes —as it is enunciated— the con-
currence of others, and thus calls for «confirmation». This call for confirmation 
is not postulated but imputed, which means —when seen from the point of view 
of the «others»— that it is disputable. This is why Kant later concludes: «[T]his 
is all for which he promises himself the agreement of everyone —a claim which, 
under these conditions, he would also be warranted in making, were it not that 
he frequently sinned against them, and thus passed an erroneous judgment of 
taste» 63.
The intersubjective contestability that Arendt emphasizes is not grounded, 
thus, on the fact that each opinion reflects the personal interests of those in-
volved; it presupposes, instead, an a priori public sense through which individu-
als both transcend their subjective conditions (preferences and interests) and 
are able, once their opinion is expressed, to acquire a position from which to 
59 Arendt, 1982: 42-43. To be impartial means to disregard self-interest, and thus making pos-
sible the application of critical standards to one’s own opinion in relation to the others’ doke moi. This 
impartiality is not the opposite of Lessing’s «taking sides», which means understanding and judging 
everything in its specificity, that is, «in terms of its position in the world at any given time». Instead, 
«taking sides» in this sense means assuming responsibility in opposition to being indifferent. See Ar-
endt, 1968: 8.
60 See Beiner’s Interpretative Essay in Arendt, 1982.
61 See disch, 1996: 141-171.
62 disch, 1996: 151.
63 Kant, 1952: § 8.
330 AmANdO BASURTO
acknowledge the disputability of one’s own point of view. This public sense is at 
the center of what Arendt calls Kant’s unwritten political philosophy.
Arendt’s quest for this public sense starts by explaining the full implications 
in the distinction between genius and taste that Kant presents in his «Critique 
of Aesthetic judgment». She explains that when Kant affirms that «genius is re-
quired for the production of art works» and taste is required «for judging them, 
for deciding whether or not they are beautiful objects», the assumption is that 
«the few who are endowed with genius do not lack the faculty of taste». In other 
words, Arendt’s argument is that judging is not an exclusive faculty of «specta-
tors». much on the contrary, both actors and spectators require a general sense 
of taste, which makes «the ideas susceptible to being permanently and generally 
assented to, and capable of being followed by others, and of an ever progressing 
culture» 64.
decentering Kant’s monophasic spectator and his privileged position of 
judgment requires recognizing not only that the spectator is «always involved 
with other spectators» but also that judging is not exclusive of spectators. And 
although the actor «never sees the meaning of the whole» (which is why the 
guiding principles of action are both forgiveness and promise 65), he has to be 
able to judge partially, from his position: the actor «knows only his part or, if 
he should judge from the perspective of acting, only the part of the whole that 
concerns him» 66. Arendt understands that in order to expose one’s opinion to the 
test of free and open examination one has to make use of the same public sense 
that is presupposed in aesthetic judgments in order to make it susceptible to be 
generally assented. Her intention is never to aestheticize either politics or her 
concept of understanding; she is interested not on aesthetic judgments but on 
what makes them possible.
What creates the impression that Arendt is aestheticizing politics is, in part, 
the intricate explanation she offers to elucidate how is that the common faculty 
of (reflective) judgment could be based on a «sense» as extremely subjective 
and incommunicable as taste 67. According to her, imagination is what makes the 
«sense of taste» (which is individual and incommunicable) suitable for the «en-
largement of the mind». Imagination «transform[s] the objects of the objective 
64 Arendt, 1982: 62, 63, my emphasis.
65 «The remedy against irreversibility and unpredictability of the process started by acting does 
not arise out of another and possibly higher faculty, but is one of the potentialities of action itself. The 
possible redemption from the predicament of irreversibility —of being unable to undo what one has 
done though one did not, and could not, have known what he was doing— is the faculty of forgiving. The 
remedy of unpredictability, for the chaotic uncertainty of the future, is contained in the faculty to make 
and keep promises». Arendt, 1998: 237, my emphasis.
66 Arendt, 1982: 63, 77, my emphasis. This exposition of «the actor’s partiality» is consistent with 
Arendt’s political interpretation of Lessing’s polemicism: the «lack of “objectivity” in Lessing’s polemi-
cism... his forever vigilant partiality... has nothing whatsoever to do with subjectivity because it is always 
framed not in terms of the self but in terms of the relationship of men to their world, in terms of their 
positions and opinions». Arendt, 1968: 29, my emphasis.
67 Arendt explains that the sense of taste is private, incommunicable, non-representational, and 
indisputable («De gustibus non disputandum est»). She thus questions: «Why then would taste... be 
elevated to and become the vehicle of the mental faculty of judgment?». Arendt, 1982: 65, 66.
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senses into «sensed» objects, as though they were objects of an inner sense. This 
happens by reflecting not on an object but on its representation». Arendt claims 
that only when one reflects on the «sensed object», one speaks «of judgment and 
no longer of taste» 68. Here again Arendt’s emphasis is on the fact that aesthetic 
judgments are not expressions of the individual’s subjective preferences and in-
terests but of the individual’s participation in taste as a public sense. This is more 
evident if one resorts to Kant’s distinction between the sense of taste and taste as 
a public sense which is much clearer than Arendt’s explanation: For Kant, taste 
is an a priori estimate of communicability, that is, «the faculty of estimating what 
makes our feeling in a given representation universally communicable without 
the mediation of a concept». In this instance, taste is «not as an organic sense 
but... a critical faculty in respect of the agreeable generally». This means, for ex-
ample, that although the subjective judgment «the rose is agreeable» is aesthetic, 
«it is not one of taste but of sense»; for the most important characteristic of a 
judgment of taste is that it is reflective, which means that its imputation of general 
agreeability does not «spring from concepts» but from a «claim to validity for 
all men» 69.
Thus, the imputation of general agreeability in a judgment of taste is possible 
because it appeals to a commonly shared sense that makes it communicable in 
contestable terms. From the perspective of Arendt’s argument, the relevant fact 
is that the public sense that is manifest in every imputation implicit in judgments 
of taste is also manifest in the equivocal validation actualized in presenting one’s 
opinion from a position of «it appears to me». This public sense is what Kant 
calls sensus communis, which he defines in The Critique of Judgment as
[A] critical faculty which in its reflective act takes account (a priori) of the mode 
of representation of everyone else, in order, as it were, to weigh its judgment with 
the collective reason of mankind, and thereby avoid the illusion arising from subjec-
tive and personal conditions which could readily be taken for objective, an illusion 
that would exert a prejudicial influence upon his judgment 70.
In contrast to sensus privatus, Arendt insists, «sensus communis is an «extra 
sense... that fits us into a community»: «One can only “woo” or “court” the 
agreement of everyone else. And in this persuasive activity one actually appeals 
to the “community sense”». In other words, when one judges, one judges as a 
member of a community» 71.
68 Ronald’s edition of Arendt’s Lectures on Kant’s Political Philosophy, includes a section on Imagi-
nation that was part of a Seminar she gave on Kant’s Critique of Judgment during the same Fall of 1970. 
In these notes Arendt explains the concept of «example» as an analogy of «schema». Kant affirmed, 
as Arendt quotes, that in cases of reflective judgment «understanding [intellect] is at the service of 
imagination». This means that, in these cases, schemas do not have a cognitive purpose but are, rather, 
an «example» liberated from «rules» and «stiff regularity» that allows «the maintenance of a free play 
of the powers of representation». As Arendt explains, if the «example is rightly chosen» then the 
«judgment has exemplary validity»; or, in words of Kant: In reflective judgments «I put forward my 
judgment of taste as an example of the judgment of commons sense». Arendt, 1982: 65, 67, 84-85, Kant, 
1952: § 22 and the General Remark on the First Section of the Analytic, my emphasis)
69 See Kant, 1952: § 7, § 8, § 40, my emphasis.
70 Kant, 1952: § 40.
71 Arendt, 1982: 70, 72. See also Arendt, 1977: 221.
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What Arendt is after are the reflexivity that Kantian aesthetic judgment re-
quires and the sensus communis it both presupposes and actualizes, not its aes-
thetic content. Which is why it is a terrible mistake to interpret Arendt’s quest 
for indications of Kant’s unwritten political philosophy in his critique of aesthet-
ic judgment as aestheticization of politics. Sensus communis —which is presup-
posed in reflective judgment— makes it possible for a plurality of individuals to 
face the same particular thing, form their opinion about it, and express it from 
a position where they can a) impute general agreeability to the opinion without 
applying a universal principle, b) give an account of how and for what reasons 
they came to be of the opinion, and c) subject it to examination in relation to 
everyone else’s opinion. For Arendt, both the communicability and publicity of 
opinion (doxa) depend on one’s ability to «think from the other person’s stand-
point» which in turn presupposes one’s participation in sensus communis 72.
As Arendt anchors the recovery of her notion of friendly exercise of persua-
sion (which she distills from Socratic maieutics) in the Kantian notions of sensus 
communis and enlarged mentality, her early concept of understanding turns into 
judging. She claims that the sensus communis implied in reflective judgments 
(which derive neither from personal preferences nor from logical inferences) is 
at the center of a form of communicability and publicity that entails the open-
ness of each opinion as well as the accountability of each participant. political 
judging is, then, the foundation of an equi-vocal form of interaction among men 
and between them and the world in which everyone engaged can understand the 
truth in the other’s opinion by understanding how and in what specific manner 
the common world appears to the other (friendship) 73.
3. Arendt’s moral judgment and political judging
As I have exhibited above, throughout her work Arendt presents two dif-
ferent ideal-types of Socrates. On the one hand, Arendt introduces Socrates as 
an exemplary «moral man» through whom she reformulates Kant’s categorical 
imperative. This reformulation informs Arendt’s concept of conscience as the 
ultimate autonomous source of morality. On the other, she presents Socrates as 
phronimos —in contrast to the philosopher (sophos)— whereby she retrieves the 
experience of the «friendly» articulation of doxa as the principle of political ac-
tion/speech. To do this Arendt recovers Kant’s sensus communis as the a priori of 
communicability, publicity and contestability, without dragging his concepts of 
monological spectator and progress with it.
Arendt’s two ideal-types of Socrates correspond to two different concepts 
of «judgment». On one side, moral judgment is the subjective manifestation of 
72 «One can communicate only if one is able to think from the other person’s standpoint; oth-
erwise one will never meet him, never speak in such a way that he understands. By communicating 
one’s feelings, ones pleasures and disinterested delights, one tells one’s choices and one chooses one’s 
company». Arendt, 1982: 74
73 This seems point seems to underlie maurizio passerin d’Entrèves’ claim that «Arendt retained the 
link between judgment and the world of human affairs, stressed the public and intersubjective dimen-
sions of judgment, and continued to emphasize its political character» passerin d’Entrèves, 1994: 14.
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conscience as the cross-examination of one by one’s self. Her claim is that, in a 
context in which the voice of God has been muted and mores has been utterly 
relativized, moral judgment is the expression of non-imperative self-respect. 
On the other side, political judging is the friendly/equi-vocal understanding 
the truth in one’s opinion that implies understanding how and in what spe-
cific manner the common world appears to the other. In this case judging is 
not subjective because it does not stem out of personal desire or predilection; 
instead, judging is intersubjective because it entails an imputation of general 
agreeability.
It is important to insist that Arendt’s proposal of an active/participatory citi-
zenship is built, precisely, on her notion of political judging and not on her no-
tion of moral judgment. For her, the only instance in which moral judgment 
may be considered tangentially political is when —in boundary situations— the 
ability to say «this is wrong» may «prevent catastrophes, at least for the self» 74. 
politics is never about preventing catastrophes for one’s self, but about the im-
putation of general agreeability that opinions presuppose.
It is not as if Arendt’s concept of political «judging» is flawless. The central 
challenge in Arendt’s definition is that it requires a normative standard while it 
eschews moral codification. This is initially evident in Arendt’s formulation of the 
two principles that curb action’s irreversibility and unpredictability: Forgiveness 
and promise. Arendt’s claim is that (political) action does not require «external» 
principles but rather includes them in its own actualization. Arendt’s intention 
in this respect is to liberate action from being subjugated to a higher system of 
norms and values 75. Nonetheless, forgiveness and promise result insufficient to 
guarantee the freedom, plurality and isonomia that are fundamental for political 
action/speech. 76 Arendt’s recovery of opinion —as an authentic imputation of 
general agreeability— requires an ethical position of friendship from which one 
is able to both understand and take into consideration how the world appear 
to others. This ethical (not moral) position is summarized in the proposition «it 
seems to me» (dokei moi) that outlines the equivocal understanding implicit in 
each and every opinion expressed about the world in common. This is precisely 
what Arendt is after: a new account of politics as a relation inter pares that makes 
possible for a plurality of individuals to face the same particular thing, form their 
opinion about it, and express it from a position where they can a) impute general 
agreeability without applying a universal principle, b) give an account of how 
and for what reasons they came to be of the opinion, and c) subject it to examina-
tion in relation to everyone else’s opinion 77.
74 Arendt, 1981: 179-193.
75 «Here the remedy against the irreversibility and unpredictability of the process started by acting 
does not arise out of another and possible higher faculty, but is one of the potentialities of action itself» 
(Arendt, 1998: 236-237).
76 See in Arendt, 2005: Introduction into Politics.
77 Arendt’s «ideal type» of Socrates as «phronimos» does not seek to recuperate a «model» of 
Socratic philosopher, but the equi-vocal experience implied in the Socratic maieutic. It is not the reenact-
ment of the «gadfly» that Arendt is recommending (although she does not seem opposed to it); she is, 
instead, trying to recover the political meaningfulness of opinion (doxa) from its prolonged philosophi-
cal and scientific underestimation. See Villa, 2001: 264, 275, 277, 278, Arendt, 1972: 64.
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This (re)new(ed) isonomic and pluralistic account of politics requires to be 
articulated in narrative terms because it cannot be imposed on the individual’s 
behavior as an external normative framework. In other words, the actualization 
of Arendt’s notion of political action calls for a cultural revolution through which 
«an attitude that knows how to take care and preserve and admire the things of 
the world» can be nurtured and fostered.
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